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CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS AND UNENFORCIBLE EXPRESS TRUSTS
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT*

It is a commonplace that courts of equity frequently base relief
solely on the violation of a confidential relation. One of numerous
examples of this action is to be found in the constructive trusts which
are often created where a grantee has broken an oral, unenforcible
promise to hold in trust for the grantor, and the grantee stood in a
confidential relation to the grantor at the time of the making of
the promise. The following is a typical case: A has conveyed land
to B on B's oral agreement to hold it in trust for A and reconvey at
A's command. A and B were in confidential relations before the
deed was made. The Statute of Frauds prevents the enforcement
of B's express promises. The retention of the land after setting up
the Statute is not generally regarded as such inequitable conduct as
to justify a decree that the holder is a constructive trustee. But
the breach of the "confidential relation" existing between A and B
is made the sole basis of a constructive trust in favor of A.
The scope and rationale of this doctrine seem unsatisfactorily
explained. Doubtless there is some truth in the remark of Professor
Pomeroy that chancery declines to define the term "confidential
relation" in order to preserve for itself complete liberty of action.
It would seem, however, that sufficient freedom could be retained
without shrouding the subject in the vague, conflicting generalities
which now obtain.
An effort will here be made to examine some of the judicial and
editorial expressions on the subject and to offer a scheme of analysis
which may clarify thought.
Discussion is confined to the typical case outlined above. Similar
will cases are excluded. Numerous other non-trust cases where
confidential relationship is an important factor are not considered.
To avoid the use of the cumbersome phrases, "the one trusting,"
"the one expressing confidence," "the confider," and the like, the
word "grantor" will be used to refer to the person who has occupied
the trusting or confiding end of the confidential relationship. And
with like purpose the awkward phrases, "the one trusted," "the
party relied upon," "the confidante," and similar words, will be
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
12 POMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 956.
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replaced by the word "grantee" when it is desired to indicate the
individual who has been the recipient of trust and confidence.
In the law of trusts no extensive effort seems to have been made
to keep the terms "confidential relation" and "fiduciary relation"
distinct. They are generally used interchangeably.2 The quotations
hereinafter given sometimes use "confidential," sometimes "fidu"ciary." They are in fact referring to the same type of relation.
Reference to a few of many judicial and editorial discussions of the
meaning and theory of operation of the confidential relation doctrine
will, it is believed, illustrate the prevalent confusion.
Many definitions of "confidential relation" seem question-begging
or so vague as to be valueless. In this class might be placed the
following:
"Stripped of all embellishing verbiage, it may be confidently
asserted that every instance in which a confidential or fiduciary
relation in fact is shown to exist will be interpreted as such...
If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties
(that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a
trust accepted by the other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused), that is sufficient as a predicate for relief."'
"A person is said to stand in a fiduciary relation to another
when ,he has rights and duties which he
4 is bound to exercise
for the benefit of that other person."
A confidential relationship is one "in which, if a wrong arise,
the same remedy exists on behalf of the injured party as would
exist against a trustee on behalf of a cestui que trust."5
An important question upon which one might well expect to
find light in the decisions, is whether "confidential relation" means
a pre-existing state of trust and confidence or whether it may be a
status arising at the time of the conveyance in question and the
expression of which is consummated in the conveyance.
Some judicial definitions seem broad enough to cover cases where
the sole proof of the confidential relationship is the deed given
on the faith of the oral promise. Thus the Supreme Court of Illinois
has used these words:6
"A fiduciary relation exists in all cases in which influence
has been acquired and abused. The origin of the confidence
2

Kochorimbus v. Maggos, 323 Iil. 510, 154 N. B.235(I926); Newell v. Halloran,

R. C. L. §§ 93, 96; 39 Cyc. 182; 2 POMEROY, op.
cit. supra note I, § 955.
ZQuinn v. Phipps, 113 So. 49, 421 (Fla. 1927).
426 R. C. L. 93.
zDick v. Albers, 243 Ill. 231, go N. E. 683 (1909).
8
Seeberger v. Seeberger, 325 Ill. 47, 51, 155 N. E. 763 (1927).
250 Pac. 986 (Utah, 1926); 20
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is immaterial. It may be moral, social, domestic, or purely
personal. If the confidence is in fact reposed by the one party
and accepted by the other, the relation is fiduciary, and equity
will regard dealings between the parties according to the rules
which apply to such relation."
Some Illinois decisions appear to support the conclusion that the
apparent breadth of the Illinois definition is actual. Thus, in Kochorimbus v. Maggos,7 the only evidence of the confidential relation
between grantor and grantee was that (i) the parties had known
each other for twenty years, (2) their wives were cousins, and (3)
the grantor had trusted the grantee in connection with the conveyance of the particular property in litigation. There was no proof
of other business dealings between them in which the grantor had
trusted the grantee. Obviously items (i)and (2) do not show a
confidential relationship. But the court held that there was such
relationship, apparently basing its decision on the single act of
trusting out of which the litigation arose. This tendency to define
the confidential relation which causes equity to act in these cases as
one which existed before the conveyance or arose out of and at the
8
time of the conveyance, is also manifested in numerous other cases.
There are, however, many other cases in which the grantor had,
by various acts, for a longer or shorter period before the conveyance,
placed reliance on the good faith and skill of the grantee, so that it
could be said that there was a pre-existing status of trust and confidence. 9 Whether or not the existence of this relationship before
the grant on an oral promise was necessary to enable equity to create
a constructive trust out of the transaction, at least there was such
prior intimacy in business affairs.
In other decisions dominance or superiority seems to be treated
as a sine qua non to the origin of a confidential relationship. It is
said that the grantee must be one who overshadows the grantor,
by reason of superior physical condition, maturity, experience,
7323 Ill. 510, 154 N. E. 235 (1926).
8
Smith v. Sharp, 70 Calif. App. 336, 233 Pac. 374 (1925); Cameron v. Ward,
8 Ga. 245 (185o); Meheula v. Hausten, 29 Haw. 3o4 (1926); Lewis v. Ziegler,
1o5 Mo. 604, 16 S. W. 862 (I89I); Wells v. Cline, 19 Ohio App. 165 (1924);
Hatcher v. Hatcher, 264 Pa. 105, 107 At1. 66o (1919).
9

See, for example, Dahlgren v. Dahlgren, I Fed. (2d) 755 (C. A. Dist. Col.

1924); Cole v. Manning, 248 Pac. IO65 (Calif. 1926); Wood v. White, 123 Me.
139, 122 Atl. 177 (1923); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313, 39 N. E. 1057
(1895); Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255 (1923); Broadway Bldg.
Co. v. Salafia, 47 R. I. 263, 132 Atl. 527 (1926).
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education or some other qualification.

Thus, an Indiana Court

has said:10

"There is no invariable rule for determining the existence
of a fiduciary relationship, but it would appear from the decisions that there must be not only confidence of the one in
the other, but there must exist a certain inequality, dependence,
weakness of age, of mental strength, business intelligence,
knowledge of the facts involved, or other conditions giving to
one advantage over the other."
And a Utah court has recently made the following statement:"
"The doctrine rests upon the principle of inequality between
the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by
one of the parties over the other. Mere confidence in one person
by another is not sufficient alone to constitute a fiduciary
relationship. The confidence must be reposed by one under
such circumstances as to create a corresponding duty, either
legal or moral, upon the part of the other to observe the confidence, and it must result in a situation where as a matter of
fact there is superior influence on one side and dependence on
the other."'1
In numerous cases courts have laid emphasis on lack of equality
between the parties as proving a confidential relationship, 13 and
sometimes lack of dominance or overweening influence has been
4
treated as a reason for refusing to find a confidential relation.
But in other decisions the fact of great superiority of position seems
to have been ignored as a basis for finding a confidential relation.
Thus, in Davis v. Stambaugh,"5 an aged father on his death bed granted
land to his daughter under an oral trust. The court refused to enforce
an express or constructive trust and did not discuss the confidential
relation doctrine.
Do certain relationships by blood or marriage per se show "confidential relations" of the kind in question? Or is kinship merely
10Yuster v. Keefe, 46 Ind. App. 46o, go N. E. 920 (191o).
"Newell v. Halloran, supra note 2, at 988. The grantee in this case had been
the agent of the grantor previously, but this relationship had terminated. Since
there was no superiority or dominance in favor of the grantee, the only possible
basis for finding a confidential relation was the single act of trusting on which
the case was founded. This was held insufficient to show a confidential relationship.
12
For similar pronouncements, see Duncan v. Dazey, 318 Ill.
5o0, 149 N. E.
495, 505 (1925); Rubin v. Midlinsky, 321 Ill.
436, 152 N. E. 217 (1926).
"3 Odell v. Moss, 137 Calif. 542, 70 Pac. 547 (19o2); Hall v. Livingston, 3 Del.
Ch. 348 (1869); Reigel v. Wood, io Okla. 279, 229 Pac. 556 (1924).
14Winkler v. Korzuskiewicz, 118 Kan. 470, 211 Pac. 124 (1923).
'5163 Ill.
557, 45 N. E. 170 (1896).
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evidence which may, alone or coupled with other facts, show a
technical "confidential relation?" In numerous cases absence of
a confidential relationship has been found, notwithstanding close
kinship between grantor and grantee, 16 while in other instances
kinship has been a factor of more or less influence in inducing the
17
court to decree a confidential relationship.
When one turns from the definition of the term "confidential
relation" to the theory on which the rule operates in saving oral
promises from the nullifying effect of the Statute of Frauds, one is
met with similarly conflicting views. In some cases the courts have
said that the transfer was "presumed fraudulent," but that this
presumption might be overcome by evidence showing fairness and
good faith on the part of the grantee, and full information in the
grantor.
One able judge has described the reason of the rule as "constructive
fraud, arising from the abuse of the confidential relation existing
between grantor and grantee."' 8 The word "constructive" in this
connection may be subjected to criticism as leaving room for argument
whether fraud implied in fact or fraud in law is meant, whether the
fraud in question may be disproved or is irrefutably proved by the
breach of the oral promise by the grantee who stood in a confidential
relation.
It has been suggested that an implied agreement by the fiduciary
not to acquire a personal advantage may explain some of the confidential relation cases.' 9
In a recent opinion entitled to great weight there seems to be a
suggestion that there is an implied exception to be read into the
Statute of Frauds, or that the grantor is justified in believing that
he may create his trust without a writing because no fiduciary will
20
set up the statute against his principal.
"6Willis v. Robertson, 121 Iowa, 380, 96 N. W. go (19o3); Burch v. Nicholson,
157 Iowa, 502, 137 N. W. io62 (1912); Von Buchwaldt v. Schlens, 123 Md. 405,
gi Atl. 466 (1914); Wolfskill v. Wells, 154 Mo. App. 302, 134 S. W. 51 (1911);
Curtis v. Crossley, 59 N. J. Eq. 358, 45 Atl. 905 (igoo); Rabassa v. Raab, 95
N. J. Eq. 255, 122 Atl. 309 (1923); Hamilton v. Buchanan, 112 N. C. 463, 17
S. E. 159 (1893); Parkes v. Burkhardt, ioi Wash. 659, 172 Pac. go8 (igi8).
- "Butler v. Hyland, 89 Calif. 575, 26 Pac. iio8 (1891); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,
69 Calif. App. 399, 231 Pac. 375 (1924); Vosburgh v. Knight, 71 Colo. 473, 207
Pae. 1112 (I9 2).
'8Burch, J., in Silvers v. Howard, io6 Kan. 762, 19o Pac. I, 4 (1920).
19Nat.
Wire Bound Box Co. v. Healy, 189 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 7th, I911).
20 Cardozo, J., in Sinclair v. Purdy, supra note 9, at 253.
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In a recent minor court decision in New York the court said :21
"In short, it is impossible to define the ground of the intervention of the court more closely perhaps than to say that it is
called for whenever the transaction is condemned by the wholesome moral sense, the mores, of the community."
Two authorities22 in the trust field have said that "undue influence"
is the explanation of the rule. Apparently they believe that the
relationship and the grant on an oral trust are some evidence of
the existence of actual undue influence exercised upon the grantor
by the grantee. And Dean Wigmore has referred the rule to "a
'
presumption of undue influence or of fraud."
Many courts employ the well worn phrase that "equity will not
allow the Statute of Frauds to become an instrument of fraud,"'
as an explanation of the confidential relationship cases of this type.
Probably the majority of American courts merely give the result
without reasoning. Perhaps the explanation is deemed so obvious
as to require no elaboration, or it may be that the courts feel no
doubt at all of the result they desire to reach but do not have clear
notions of any logical steps by which such result could be justified.
21

Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 24 Misc. 86,

N. Y. Supp. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
RFv. 366, 373-"The requirement of active solicitation before charging the legatee or devisee as trustee
is apparently the adoption of the view that such solicitation constitutes undue
influence which will not make the legacy or devise void, but will justify equity
in enforcing a trust against the wielder of the undue influence. The same idea is
back of the view that if the relation of special trust and confidence exists between
the testator and legatee or devisee, a constructive trust should be enforced."
Scott, Conveyances Upon Trusts Not ProperlyDeclared (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV.
653, 66I-"Again it is settled that if the transferee procured the conveyance by
undue influence, a constructive trust will be raised in favor of the transferor.
Thus, if it is shown that there was a confidential relationship existing between
the transferor and the transferee at the time of the transfer, and that as a result
of an abuse of the confidence reposed in him by the transferor because of this
relationship, the transferee was enabled to procure the transfer, a constructive
trust will be raised even in the absence of actual fraud... There is no agreement
in the cases as to just what constitutes a confidential relationship sufficient to
serve as the basis for imposing a constructive trust."
235 WGmORE, EvnDEmcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2503: "Where the grantee or other
beneficiary of a deed or will is a person who has maintained intimate relations
with the grantor or testator, or has drafted or advised the terms of the instrument, a presumption of undue influence or of fraud on the part of the beneficiary
has often been applied. But it is not possible to say that any single circumstance
or group of facts is the invariable mark of such a presumption, or that there is
any uniform rule capable of application apart from the facts of each case."
24
Catalini v. Catalini, 124 Ind. 54, 24 N. E. 375 (I89O); Hatcher v. Hatcher.
supra note 8.

uCostigan, Constructive Trusts (1915)

207

28 HARv. L.
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Be that as it may, many decisions merely find the confidential relation
and the breach of the grantee's promise as facts, and then jump to
the constructive trust without more.
Since the fifteenth century courts of equity have held that if one
vests the legal or equitable title to real or personal property in another
under an agreement to hold for the benefit of the transferor, the
court will (subject to the Statute of Frauds and Statute of Wills)
enforce the claim of the transferor as a use or trust.
Chancery has also long boasted that it regards the substance and
not the form. In many situations the property interests of one are
by his conduct subjected to the practical control of another, dltho
the latter has no title, legal or equitable. In these situations the
one vested with control through ability to act on the titleholder,
is in as strong a position as a trustee. When he gets that control
through the act of the other in extending confidence that the control
will be used for unselfish purposes, the one vested with control is
in substance a trustee and ought to be treated as such by equity.
It is believed that in creating and applying the confidential relation
doctrine equity has treated the holder of control as if he were a
holder of title.
For example, if A and B are in intimate business relations, B
advising A with regard to the management of A's property, and A
implicitly following B's advice, B is in a position to buy and sell
and lease and mortgage for A just as if B had the legal estate in all
A's realty and personalty as trustee for A. B causes the purchases,
sales, mortgages and leases for A, not by his (B's) action in making
a deed or what not, but by working on A and securing action on the
part of A. The whole of A's land and goods is just as much under the
influence of B as if B were a trustee of them. B holds a practical
power of control which makes him in the view of equity a quasitrustee of all of the things over which his influence extends.
Thus, when B, the confidential adviser of the kind described,
takes to himself a deed from A of a part of the property over which
B's influence has previously extended, B is in substance taking a
conveyance of property which is already trust property. No promise
by B to hold it in trust made at the time of the conveyance, or
breach of such promise, is necessary to make the property conveyed
trust property. It was in substance trust property before the conveyance. B's position after the conveyance is substantially equivalent
to that of a strict trustee who by some means gets the title to trust
property in his own name with no mention of the trust on the record.
The subsequent conduct of B in seeking to set up the Statute of
Frauds and apply the property to his own benefit, is thus strictly
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analogous to a true trustee's misapplication of trust funds.

It is

in substance a breach of a trust in favor of A which had attached to
the property before it was conveyed to B. When a strict trustee has
title to property which is identified as trust property, whether the
record discloses the trust or not, the trustee is forced by equity to
carry out his trust. So B should be obliged to.respect the equity
which attached to the property in favor of A, before B got his deed.
This quasi-trust, or control accepted for another's benefit, is enforced
through a constructive trust, chancery's remedial weapon against
all inequitable holding.
If'this theory of "confidential relations" be accepted, it ought to
be possible to make the definition of that term more certain than
do the existing authorities, heretofore quoted. If a confidential
relation is to be a quasi-trust, we ought to find in it the substantial
equivalents of the elements of a true trust. The "grantor" and
"grantee," of course, always afford possible cestui and trustee.
But there should be a trust res in this quasi-trust, as there must
be in a strict trust. Unless the confidence imposed by the grantor
has resulted in giving to the grantee power over some of the property
interests of the grantor, there is lacking an essential element. If
the facts are merely, as alleged in an Arkansas case,25 that the grantor
and grantee had been "intimate friends of long standing," that the
grantor had reposed "unbounded trust" in the grantee, and that
there was "reciprocal trust and confidence," there is no res for the
quasi-trust. The grantor may have owned no property during the
period of reliance. His trust may have been merely a mental attitude.
It may not have subjected any specific property interests to the power
of the grantee in the manner in which the true trust subjects specific
property interests to the control of the trustee.
Even though the trust and confidence exist in the mind of one
and are expressed to the person in whom they rest, they should
be of no significance as creating a technical confidential relation,
unless the property rights of the trusting party are affected. A
citizen may have observed a bank president for years, noted his
honesty and prudence, and expressed often to the president admiration
of his character and works, and yet he ought not to be regarded as
in a confidential relation with the president until he has given the
president some influence over his business affairs by taking advice
about actual transactions, becoming a customer of the bank, or
other similar conduct. If a confidential relation is to be a quasi-trust,
it should result from confidence expressed in such a way as to affect
property rights.
25

0'Connor v. Patton, 171 Ark. 626, 286 S. W. 822 (1926).
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Furthermore, not every kind of confidence expressed so as to affect
property rights will do. A customer of a food dealer relies on his
grocer to furnish wholesome food, and to give honest measure for
fair prices. This is trust expressed in conduct which may affect the
pocket book of the customer. But this is not the trust and confidence
necessary to create a confidential relation of the kind we are considering. The trust and confidence imposed by a quasi-cestuiin a true
confidential relation must be an extraordinary reliance which causes
the quasi-cestui to drop his guard, abandon formalities, and deal
with another in intimacy. It must be the analogue of the reliance
which the beneficiary of a technical trust is entitled to place in his
trustee. It must, as in the true trust, spring from a requirement
of the utmost good faith imposed on the opposite party. A grocer
is required to use merely the ordinary care of a reasonably prudent
man in dealing with his customer. He and the customer deal at
arm's length. At least to some extent caveat emptor applies. Even
though the customer relies and confides implicitly in the grocer,
he is not in a confidential relation with him for the reason that the
confidence expressed is of an inferior character.
If the quasi-trust theory is to be followed, it would seem necessary
that the expression of confidence of the kind described should continue down to the time of the deed in question, in order that the
confidential relation doctrine may be applied. It ought not to be
sufficient that previously such confidence existed, if it was violated
and thereafter the confidence was withdrawn and the control over
the property ceased. The important fact should be the continuance
of the requisite trust down to the time of the deed on the oral trust.
If an express trust has ended, subsequent transactions between the
former trustee and former cestui are not subjected to any scrutiny
by equity.
Attention has previously been directed to the failure of courts
and writers to emphasize the requirement that the confidential
relation must be pre-existing. If a contemporaneous confidential
relation will do, too much is proved. Then the confidential relation
doctrine completely negatives the Statute of Frauds. Every grantor
on an oral trust has high faith in his grantee and gives the grantee
power over the grantor's property. If he did not have such strong
confidence, he surely would either refuse to make the deed or would
demand that the express trust be stated in writing. The deed proves
the existence at the time of the deed of a confidential relation. While
logically it may be difficult to differentiate the new and the old
confidential relations in the effect which they should produce in
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equity, it would seem inevitable on grounds of expediency that the
courts ought to insist on a preexisting confidential relation in order
to save the Statute of Frauds from complete destruction.
A much better way out would be to decree a return of the property
to the grantor in all cases of breach of the oral trust,-this on the
basis of a constructive trust, and not an express trust. This would
be on the theory that it would be inequitable not to restore the
grantor to his former position, after the grantee has set up the Statute
8
of Frauds. This is Dean Ames' restitutio in integrum doctrine
which unfortunately has not been received with favor by the courts.
If such a line were followed, the confidential relation doctrine could
be abandoned in this department of the law. Bu. assuming that
the great majority of the courts are to continue to refuse to see an
inequitable holding in the retention of land after setting up the
Statute of Frauds, then they surely desire to limit the confidential
relation doctrine as above indicated. They must mean, if they are
pressed to explain, a confidential relation existing prior to the grant
on an oral trust and arising out of a transaction or transactions other
than the grant and the negotiations leading up to it.
Dominance is not necessary to the origin of a trust and it should
not be a prerequisite to the rise of the quasi-trust or confidential
relation. It is not required in order to have an express trust that
the trustee should tower over the cestui in physical, mental, or moral
qualities. They may be on a parity. It is believed that the conception, previously referred to, that there can be no confidential
relation without dominance or superiority of position, is due to
confusion of thought. The mere fact that A is ignorant and inexperienced, and B educated and skilled in affairs, does not tend to
prove that A and B are in a confidential relation. A may have
trusted B and given B influence in A's affairs or he may not. If
there has been such trust extended and influence acquired, it is
immaterial whether the parties were equal or unequal as far as the
existence of the confidential relation is concerned. But the disparity
is important for another reason. It is evidence from which a finding
of undue influence would be justified. If an aged, feeble, ignorant
man conveys to an able-bodied, experienced business man, under
an oral trust, a court may well treat the facts of disparity and the
conveyance as some evidence of actual undue influence, or as raising
a presumption of undue influence, or as creating a duty on the grantee
to introduce evidence to show good faith, full disclosure and a fair
26

Ames, Constructive Trusts Based upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of
Land (1907) 2o HARv. L. REv. 549.
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price. But it is a misnomer to use "confidential relation" to describe
the dominant character of the stronger. The stronger may have
been trusted so as to cgme into a confidential relation, but the mere
dominance does not show the trusting. There seems to have been a
confusion of the qua -trust and undue influence concepts at this
point.
In arguing that dominance is not a relevant factor in determining
the existence of a confidential relation, the writer does not wish to
be understood as 4tating that, after a confidential relation has been
created, superiority of influence on the side of the confidante is not
a necessary resu ., Such superiority is an effect or consequence of
the confidential felation, and not a cause of the origin of the confidential relation.
Relationship by blood or marriage between grantor and grantee
ought to be significant in proving a confidential relationship only
in so far as it shows that the property of the grantor has actually,
prior to the deed on oral trust, been under the control of the grantee.
Mere kinship does not prove the existence of a spirit of reliance on
the good faith and ability of another, nor does it necessarily prove
control by one over the property of another. Near relatives frequently
are on bad terms and place no trust the one in the other. Many
near kinsmen have no business transactions with each other. If
actual trust of a high character affecting the grantor's property
interests has existed, the fact of close family relationship between
grantor and grantee will explain and corroborate the other evidence
regarding extension of confidence but the relationship alone will not
tend to show the reliance.
It is true that many decisions state that the more intimate family
relationships show ipso facto a confidential relation. For example,
it is often stated that, as a matter of law, a husband stands in a
confidential relation to his wife.2 7 To the writer it would seem better
to explain these cases as instances of unrebutted presumption of fact.
Most wives place confidence of the highest type, and of a propertyaffecting nature, in their husbands. Most husbands have in fact the
practical control over their wives' property interests which characterize the quasi-trustee. Consequently the mere existence of the
relation of man and wife might well be held to be primafacieevidence
of the existence of a confidential relation. But this presumption
should be capable of rebuttal by the husband, if he shows that
actually no confidence was extended and no control existed.
27

Huffme v. Lincoln,

52

Mont. 585, 16o Pac.

820

(1916).
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To a limited extent parents and husbands have been given, by
the common law or statute, property rights in the wages or services
of their wives or minor children. And certain rights of guardianship
or control over the property of the wives or infant children may
likewise be conferred by common law or statute on the parents in
the one case and husbands in the other. In so far as there is such
property control by virtue of the relationship alone, then mere
kinship does prove an intimate relationship of the technical character
under discussion, created not by the act of the grantor but by operation of law. This relationship might well be called a "fiduciary
relationship." It does not arise from actual confidence extended
but from a duty created by law.
To the writer it has seemed desirable to use the terms "fiduciary"
and "confidential" to distinguish two separate types of relationships.
The former term might well be reserved for relations which have
distinct names and compartments in the law, as, for example, the
trust, agency, guardianship, etc. While the latter might be applied
to that large miscellaneous list of cases where actual trust and
confidence of a high type creates a corresponding duty, but where
no tag or label can be given to the relationghip except the broad term
confidential relationship. Thus used, the term "fiduciary" would
lay emphasis on intimacy arising from the innate character of certain
fixed institutions, while "confidential" would stress intimacy having
its origin in the attitude of a party himself.
Two other explanations of the theory of operation of the confidential relation rule may be urged with some force, although they
do not seem as satisfactory as the reason offered above.
In strict trusts equity has two fundamental doctrines, namely,
(i) the trustee must act solely in the interest of the cestui que trust,
and never in the trust administration accept a personal benefit
aside from his commissions; (2) when the trustee and cestui que trust
contract or the cestui conveys property to the trustee, the burden is
on the trustee to show the fairness of the contract or transfer.
The former rule arises from knowledge that if the interests competing for the trustee's attention are those of the cestui and of the trustee
personally, the trustee will often out of the weakness of human
nature, prefer his own advantage to that of the beneficiary. It is
a rule of policy to force the trustee to single-minded loyalty to his
trust. The penalty for its violation is that the cestui que trust may,
at his option, treat the trustee as a constructive trustee of the private
gain the trustee has made in administering the trust, irrespective
of proof by the trustee of his good faith or the lack of injury to the
cestui.
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The second rule is designed to prevent imposition on the cestui
by the trustee. The former is generally superior in knowledge as
to the value of the cestui que trust's interest. The cestui que trust
naturally expects that he may confide in the trustee and rely on
his honesty. These advantages which the trustee has over the cestui
make it easy for him to defraud the cestui. History shows many
cases of actual imposition. To guard the cestui que trust against this
danger, equity places a burden on the trustee to show the fairness
of the transaction between himself and the beneficiary. Equity
does not declare the transaction void, or voidable in all events by
the cestui. It makes the trustee a constructive trustee of the property
received from the cestui que trust, unless the trustee sustains the
burden of proving the transfer fair.
It is common knowledge that equity has applied these two doctrines
to situations outside the realm of strict trusts where analogous
circumstances exist and the same results are to be accomplished.
The no-profit-in-trust-administration rule has been applied to
agents, executors, administrators, attorneys, directors of corporations,
guardians, and others who are not strict trustees but whose functions
are like those of the trustee in that they act for others and are entrusted with power over, and title to or possession of, things to be
used for the advantage of another. These quasi-trustees have well
recognized distinct names and classifications in the law. There are
also many transactions, situations and dealings which cannot be
tagged or placed in a particular compartment of the law, but which
nevertheless show a status of reliance on the integrity and skill of
another. The one trusted has received communications and information, rendered services and given advice in a way analogous
to the transactions which occur in trusts and agencies. The one
trusted in a loose way acts for the other and has the power to affect
the latter's financial interests. Equity applies this no-profit rule
to all these fiduciaries from the strict trustee down to the most
remote quasi-trustee in order to encourage fidelity and loyalty.
The presumed-fraud-in-superior-to-inferior transaction rule is likewise administered where the relationship is a quasi-trust having a
distinct name in the law, as for example, agency and guardianship;
and in the looser, vaguer relationships without a separate tag or
pigeon-hole in the analysis of legal relations. So long as there is
trust reposed on the one side and superiority of influence on the other,
there is need for scrutiny of transactions between the two parties,
no matter what names the parties may bear in digest or dictionary.
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If A, standing in a confidential relation with B, conveys land to B,
under an oral promise by B to hold the land in trust for A, and later
B repudiates his promise and sets up the Statute of Frauds, have we
a case of (I) attempted misappropriation of trust property, or (2)
attempted profit in trust administration, or (3) a conveyance from
inferior to superior? If (I), the property in question is restored to
the plaintiff because it was the subject matter of a quasi-trust which
existed before the conveyance by A to B and which equity enforces
as a constructive trust. If (2), if would seem that, to put it in the
usual way, there would be a conclusive presumption of fraud, or,
to put it in another manner, A could charge B as a constructive
trustee of the land for A, regardless of the Statute of Frauds and
regardless of any proof B might offer as to fairness. If (3), the usual
phraseology applicable would seem to be that there was a rebuttable
presumption of fraud and that the burden was on B to show the
fairness of the transaction, or, in other words, that A could charge
B as a constructive trustee only if B failed to show A had freely
conveyed with full knowledge of all relevant facts and that the
consideration, if any was intended to pass, was adequate.
For the reasons previously stated the writer believes theory (x)
is the most natural and reasonable.
It may be argued that what B in the illustration is doing is attempt28
ing to get a profit for himself in setting up the Statute of Frauds.
Here the emphasis is placed on B's act of repudiation of his promise
and pleading the Statute. No stress is laid on the transfer itself as
per se having any effect. The argument is that one who was prior
to the deed already a trustee or quasi-trustee is disabled from getting
private advantage by raising rules of law or statutes which would
be available to the non-fiduciary. This is perhaps the view expressed
in the New York decision previously referred to.29 To this argument
an answer can be made, namely, that the no-profit-in-trust-administration rule is aimed against acquisition by the trustee of
non-trust property through third persons in the course of the administration and not against a breach of trust in appropriating the
trust property itself. And, of course, a reply to this answer may
well be that the proponents of theory (2) do not accept the thesis
that the property of the one extending confidence is quasi-trust
property before the deed on oral trust. They may well allege that
a confidential relation does not involve a res but rather only two
28

Story seems to have accepted this theory: STORY, EQUITY
(i 4 th ed. 1918) § 446.
2
Sinclair v. Purdy, supra note 9.
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persons. If they are right, theory (i) must be abandoned and a
choice made between theories (2) and (3).
It may also be urged with much force that the case is really one
of transfer from inferior to superior. Here the fact which is stressed
is not the repudiation of the promise by B, but rather the obtaining
of title by B when in a position of influence over A. This transfer,
without more, would, it may be uried, place the burden on B to
prove that the transfer was equitable, that is, that it was a gift
from an adult of sound mind, acting freely on full information and
without undue influence by the transferee, or that it was a transfer
for consideration made by a similar transferror who received a
recompense of at least reasonable adequacy.
Other things being equal, probably that theory of the operation
of the confidential relation doctrine should be preferred which makes
it easiest for the grantor to prove his case and hardest for the grantee
to defend. The probability of a grantor simulating a confidential
relation and an oral trust in order to set aside a bona fide transfer
is not great. If he succeeds in such wrongful use of the confidential
relation rule, the utmost disadvantage to the grantee will be to
deprive him of a gift, or an expected profit in the case of a sale. On
the other hand, one knows that instances of the violation of confidence are numerous.
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